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ABSTRACT 
On January 29, 2010, Washington announced that it would sell $6.4 billion worth of 
weapons to Taiwan.  Beijing responded that it would curtail military exchanges with 
Washington and, for the first time, announced the possibility of sanctions on the U.S. 
corporations involved in the arms sale.  Instead of its usual protest to the U.S. 
government, Beijing threatened a broadened attack on the defense corporations involved 
in the deal and warned that it would hold them accountable if they followed through on 
the U.S. government’s decision.  In a lucrative economy like China’s, sanctions on 
American corporations could have a dramatic affect on their global competitiveness. 
This thesis shows that not only does China have the legal capability to levee such 
sanctions against U.S. defense-related corporations, but also that such corporations are to 
a certain degree vulnerable to Chinese pressure because of the internationalization of 
their civilian sectors.  It therefore appears that this new coercive tactic of the People’s 
Republic of China is to leverage the self-interests of these corporations against future 
sales of weapons to Taiwan.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
In the past, defense corporations could have been labeled as autarkic or self-
sufficient.  Located solely within the United States, U.S. defense corporations hired 
mainly American workers and subcontracted within national borders.  Held close and 
protected by the federal government, these national assets not only created defense 
products, but also developed technological advancements to further the security of the 
United States.1 
Over the past couple of decades, however, U.S. defense corporations have 
experienced the benefits of internationalizing certain components and sectors of their 
operations.  While this creates many cost-optimization benefits and develops access to 
new markets, these defense multinational corporations (DMNCs) have begun to show 
signs of distorting the linkage of nationalism in the effort to further capitalistic gains.2  
This thesis addresses whether the United States has the appropriate regulations and 
oversight to protect these national assets from international pressure and politics, 
specifically in the area of subcontracting internationally and the operations of the 
respective civilian sectors of the U.S. DMNCs.  
Countries like China appear to benefit the most from the internationalization of 
corporations.  With the trade deficit between the United States and China growing every 
year, China stands poised to develop further relations with U.S. corporations as they 
continue to entangle their operations within the Chinese economy.3  U.S. defense 
corporations are no exception to this.  To help buffer revenue in times of defense budget 
                                                 
1 Ann Markusen and Sean Costigan, eds., Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 442 (accessed September 8, 2010), 305. 
2 This observation will be shown within subsequent sections.  
3 Chad P. Bown and others,  “The U.S. Trade Deficit: Made in China?” Economic Perspectives 29, no. 
4 (2005, 2005), 2–18. http://search.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ 
login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=19121453&site=ehost-live&scope=site (accessed October 27, 2010). 
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cutting, U.S. DMNCs have shifted certain assets to take part in the civilian market.4  
Utilizing the benefits of international logistics and operational costs, DMNCs have 
continued to subcontract non-specialized tasks to foreign countries with low production 
costs such as China.5  This has created a dependency on certain foreign corporations to 
produce materials and items that will be used in highly sensitive and technologically 
advanced weaponry.  While those products that are deemed highly sensitive by the U.S. 
government are regulated and protected, civilian operations and foreign non-specialized 
subcontracting appear are not even though the success of these operations are tied to the 
success of U.S. weapons development.6  With the highly sensitive nature of DMNCs and 
their close ties to U.S. politics, the issue arises of whether the civilian sectors and non-
sensitive subcontracting of the DMNCs are regulated adequately to protect them from 
foreign conflict? 
B. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS 
It appears that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is aware of such 
vulnerabilities.  After the announcement from Washington concerning the sale of $6.4 
billion worth of weapons to Taiwan, Beijing responded for the first time by threatening to 
hold accountable the DMNCs involved in the trade, and reserved the right to place 
sanctions on their operations.7  Those corporations are Northrop Grumman, Boeing, 
United Technologies (UTC), Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon—all of which are defense 
corporations in the United States.8  Given the scale of China’s economy, sanctions on 
these DMNCs could have a dramatic effect on their global competitiveness.   
                                                 
4 For the remainder of this thesis, all DMNCs mentioned are U.S. DMNCs unless otherwise stated.  
5 Non-specialized subcontracting, as per this thesis, represents the hiring of other companies to 
develop components such as nails, screws, plastic molding, etc. They are generally considered components 
necessary to build specialized weapon systems but are not high tech and are therefore subcontracted to 
another company.   
6 Later in this thesis, it will be shown how the success of the civilian sectors has a direct correlation to 
the success of the defense sector.   
7  Cara Anna, “China: Taiwan Arms Sales Hurt National Interest,” Associated Press (2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9709332 (accessed September 9, 2010). 
8  Nick Zieminski, “UPDATE 1–United Technologies: No Slowdown in China Orders,” Reuters 
(February 17, 2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN1712484420100217 (accessed September 9, 2010). 
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Because the United States does not sell arms to the PRC, these threatened 
sanctions must be aimed at another operation within U.S. DMNCs.  Whether or not 
Beijing places sanctions on these corporations, the PRC must believe there is a targetable 
weakness in the operations of current U.S. defense corporations, otherwise the threat 
could call China’s credibility into question.  This, therefore, drives a necessity to evaluate 
exactly how vulnerable these DMNCs are to foreign sanctions and, therefore, Chinese 
pressure.  
With the internationalization of certain components and operations overseas, this 
thesis therefore addresses whether DMNCs have over-extended themselves to a point 
they are now vulnerable to foreign pressure because of the political linkage to their U.S. 
weapons contracting.  
To adequately answer this question, preliminary questions must also be 
addressed: 
 What can be learned about past actions of MNCs and DMNCs over the 
years?  Do DMNCs show a strong linkage to their host government, or are 
they becoming independent from national ties?  Are DMNCs capable of 
bending to foreign pressure over the interests of their host nation? 
 If Beijing cannot directly sanction U.S. weapons, then exactly what can be 
sanctioned that could cause great pressure on DMNC operations?  How 
connected to the Chinese market are U.S. DMNCs, and are they 
vulnerable to Chinese pressure? 
 What rules and regulations are in place to protect DMNCs from foreign 
pressure and attack?  Are there adequate institutions and regulations in 
place to protect civilian operations, and is there control over the 
subcontracting of non-sensitive components to foreign corporations?   
 Finally, what does this mean for the future of DMNCs and their future 
operations in China? 
 4
C. METHODOLOGY AND OVERVIEW 
To best answer the questions at hand, this thesis starts by examining past research 
documenting the actions and observations of both MNCs and DMNCs.  By their very 
nature, it can be seen how the internationalization of corporations has thinned the fabric 
of nationalistic allegiances and created a political melting pot for these corporations to 
operate in.  This chapter highlights not only the reality of foreign pressures to DMNC 
operations but also the plausibility of DMNCs succumbing to foreign pressure over the 
interests of their host nation. 
Two areas of concern arise in this research: foreign subcontracting and civilian 
sector operations.  As to the time in which this thesis is being written, Beijing does not 
have the ability to buy or affect the sales of U.S. weaponry; however, it may have the 
capability to affect the logistics, operations, and revenue of the DMNCs.  It will be shown 
in Chapter III that DMNCs have become dependent on cheap labor in China to 
subcontract non-specialized components.  This dependence can lead to complications and 
rising in costs if the PRC intervenes.  The other area is the respective civilian sectors of 
these DMNCs.  It can be shown that all five of the DMNCs depend on civilian revenue in 
varying degrees.  For some, civilian sales in China are of the utmost importance and any 
complications or hindrance in their civilian operations in China could be detrimental to 
their survival in the competitive world.  
While Chapter III shows vulnerability in these two areas, it is important to 
analyze pertinent laws and regulations to understand whether or not there are adequate 
structures or barriers in place to protect them from such vulnerability.  Therefore, Chapter 
IV analyzes whether China, as a members of the WTO, has the legal capability to levy 
sanctions on the DMNCs involved in the arms sales.  This also calls into question exactly 
what types of protection the United States has in place to protect DMNCs.  Investigating 
the nature and context of discussion from the PRC, it may be found that the type of 
sanction threatened by the Chinese may be aimed at a certain sector and, therefore, may 
shed light on exactly how the Chinese intend to effectively squeeze the DMNCs 
involved. 
 5
If the vulnerabilities can be shown to be significant, and no existing protection 
exists, then Beijing has the means, effectively and efficiently, to bring pressure on U.S. 
DMNCs.  If this is true, then the threatened sanctions are not only credible but, if enacted, 
could be detrimental to the health of U.S. corporations and to American national security 
interests.   
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II. DMNCS: SETTING THE STAGE 
The outcome of success in modern warfare is no longer based upon the strategic 
calculation of sheer manpower, but a comparable power calculation in the effective use of 
weapons and technological advantages.  Well-utilized weapons of today can tip the 
balance of war and decide the outcome of battles.  According to Martin Van Creveld, 
“Where once war was waged by men employing machines, more and more war is seen as 
a contest between machines that are served, maintained and managed by men.”9  As man 
continues to rely increasingly upon advanced systems and weapons capability as a source 
of military strength, the sheer complexity of weapon systems has exponentially increased 
over the years.  No longer are components of weapons able to operate independently but 
must instead be linked together with varying levels of system integration.  In today’s 
modern weaponry, highly sophisticated computer chips now control even the most 
mundane system operations.  In the 1960s and 70s, only 2 percent of the F-4 Phantom’s 
cost was designated for computer systems and software; however, decades later, the F-15 
and the F-18 are over 26 percent and 40 percent, respectively.10  If cost increases due to 
component sophistications were not enough, the required amount spent on research and 
development has exponentially increased to further technological advancement.  In the 
1950s, research and development costs on average accounted for only 5 percent of the 
total cost of a project; however, by the late 1980s, costs toward research and development 
were 50 percent.11 
As with research and development, the overall cost of today’s weapons projects 
are extensive and growing exponentially.  With fluctuations in defense budgeting and 
changing dynamics in weapons procurement, the U.S. defense industrial base has 
morphed over the years to accommodate such destabilizing effects on profit margins.  To 
                                                 
9 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present (New York: Free Press) 
(accessed November 8, 2010), 225. 
10 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) (accessed September 9, 2010), 77. 
11  The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution (Washington D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 
[1987]) (accessed November 15, 2010), 3. 
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best understand the U.S. DMNCs of today, this chapter will analyze the course of DMNC 
operations over the past couple of decades with specific attention to the new age 
dynamics that DMNCs face in their every day operations.  These changes in dynamics 
can be attested to the internationalization process and the corresponding complications 
associated with it.  It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight the very likely scenario 
that DMNCs face foreign pressure on multiple fronts and have in the past demonstrated 
an eagerness to please foreign markets over that of their domestic national interests. 
A. SHAPING DMNCS OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES 
Prior to the 1970s, with the struggle for power between the Soviet Union and 
America, U.S. DMNCs were at “a remarkable degree of autarky.”12  However, since the 
decline in the Cold War, the strategic trajectory of U.S. DMNCs has altered vigorously 
over the years.  Constricted and expanded by the many dynamics the U.S. government 
and other markets have presented, the focus and strategies of these corporations have 
changed to meet new needs.  In the early periods of defense industrialization, 
corporations were riddled across the American continent competing for contracts and 
funding.  In the 1970s, the defense corporations experienced their highest demand in U.S. 
weapons contracting during which was the height of the Cold War.  After the fall of the 
Berlin wall, these corporations witnessed large cuts in defense spending in what was 
known as “peace dividends.”13  The U.S. defense budget declined 28% in the 1990s, 
causing a large-scale decline in U.S. DMNC production.  Not only did the United States 
experience defense budget cuts, but also the worldwide per capita spending on defense 
articles dropped from $254 to $142.14  Declining from 431 billion to 322 billion over the 
                                                 
12  Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing 
Calculus of Conflict, 81 
13  Terrance R. Guay, “Globalization and its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base,” Strategic 
Studies Institute (February, 2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB756.pdf 
(accessed August 2, 2010), 6 
14  Richard Bitzinger, “Globalization in the Post-Cold War Defense Industry: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” in Arming the Future:A Defense Industry for the 21st Century, eds. Ann Markusen and 
Sean Costigan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), 305 (accessed September 20, 2010), 
3. 
 9
course of the 1990s, U.S. DMNCs quickly searched for new ways to procure revenue to 
continue the funding of research and development.  
In the 1990s, three large effects occurred as a result of the large budget cuts.15  In 
an attempt to find new markets, DMNCs started looking more heavily overseas to 
establish new sources of revenue and develop more cost effective supply chains.16  
Through internationalization, DMNCs found that supply chains could be moved and 
altered to best utilize the various incentives in certain locations.17  Second, DMNCs, 
realizing the decline in revenue from defense sales, starting selling portions of their 
business or conducting mergers.  Over the next decade or so the number of DMNCs 
quickly dwindled and became a larger select few as the existing DMNCs purchased 
military assets of those firms leaving the defense market.  Finally, to stabilize balance 
sheets, most DMNCs quickly invested in civilian sectors.  In most cases, DMNCs looked 
for markets in which they could use their previous skill sets and strengths to find new 
revenue in the civilian market.  Whether or not dual-use technology was engaged, 
DMNCs quickly searched for civilian sources of revenue to help balance and stabilize 
revenue input during times of low defense spending.  
The U.S. government has been proactive this time around.  Seeing declining 
defense spending as the War on Terror starts to wind down, the Under Secretary of 
Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics tasked the Defense Business Board to 
“identify the potential implications for the industrial base of downward pressure on the 
defense budget.”18  Again, as in the 1990s, the task group found that within the industrial 
base, the “downward pressure” would cause corporations to shift towards commercial 
marketing, increasing amounts of mergers, and continual internationalization of supply 
                                                 
15 In most cases, the DMNCs anticipated such up and coming effects and in varying degrees actually 
started to engage in these activities in the 1970s and on. 
16  Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing 
Calculus of Conflict, 92. 
17  Guay, Globalization and its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base, 37. 
18  Michael Bohn and others, Task Group on Assessing the Defense Industrial Base (Washington D.C.: 
Defense Business Board, [2010]), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA519057 (accessed November 11, 2010), 
3. 
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chain logistics.19  They concluded that these three factors not only had a large affect on 
the DMNCs but that the amount of defense funding reductions would determine the 
“aggressiveness” of the DMNCs to pursue such alternatives.20 
1. Mergers 
As the Cold War was coming to an end, most could see that the defense budget 
was about to shrink.  After years of highly profitable defense contracting, the market was 
bloated with numerous players holding high stakes with large infrastructure and 
numerous capable employees.  Understanding the possibility of collapse and future 
repercussions, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry called together the 
executives of the top DMNCs and held what is now known as the “last supper.”  In this 
meeting he told the corporations that, in the coming years, most of them would not 
survive and, therefore, no longer succeed in the defense sector.  Fearing an uncontrollable 
affect from such news, he urged the industry to downsize and combine so as to help 
maintain some resemblance of the defense industrial base.21 
Quickly seeing the writing on the wall, defense corporations realized that they 
could no longer depend on defense contracting as before.  Instead, the lucrative market 
had cooled down and, with no apparent enemy looming over the horizon, most 
corporations believed that there was no quick reprieve and so saw no future for the types 
of defense spending seen in the past.  Coupled with the direct statement of William Perry, 
DMNCs quickly re-evaluated their business strategy.  Some decided to sell their defense 
sectors and focus more on civilian sectors whereas others saw this as a prime opportunity 
to capitalize on the remaining market share.  Defense spending had decreased but was 
still present.  Companies like Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and Northrop  
 
 
                                                 
19 Michael Bohn and others, Task Group on Assessing the Defense Industrial Base, 3. 
20  Michael Bohn and others, Task Group on Assessing the Defense Industrial Base,  4. 
21  Joe Conley, “Impacts of Declining Budgets and Defense Mergers on the Department of Defense,” 
Army War College (April 9, 2002), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404275 (accessed November 15, 
2010), 9. 
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Grumman took this as an opportunity to invest in multiple different types of sectors along 
with buying up their competitors.  Figure 1 highlights the multitude of mergers that have 
occurred over the past millennium. 
 
Figure 1.   Example of DMNC Mergers Over the Millennium22 
As was the conclusion from a congressional report, the occurrence of mergers and 
acquisitions was a direct response to the 61-percent decline in defense spending.23  Those 
who decided to stay in the business set forth in attempts to buy up the remaining share of 
the market.  Table 1 highlights exactly how many transactions occurred over the time 
period of ten years.  Over the span of two decades starting in the 1980s, 50 of the largest 
DMNCs had since become the top five.24 
The understanding of the merger process between DMNCs highlights how the 
overall look and feel of the U.S. defense industrial base changed rapidly to meet new 
pressures.  Today there are fewer defense corporations; however, they are not only larger 
                                                 
22  Saar Golde and Asher Tishler, “Security Needs, Arms Export, and the Structure of the Defense 
Industry: Determining the Security Level of Countries,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 5 (Oct, 
2004, 2004), 762 (accessed October 30, 2010), 680. 
23  Report on the Effect of Mergers in the Defense Industry (Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, [1997]), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA323934 (accessed November 13, 2010), 7. 
24  Greg Schneider and Renae Merle, “Reagan’s Defense Buildup Bridged Military Eras,” Washington 
Post June 9, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26273-2004Jun8.html (accessed 
November 15, 2010). 
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in magnitude, but also excel in multiple sectors.  The conglomeration of defense science 
amongst the DMNCs allows them to more effectively system integrate their weapons and 
to be able to tackle almost all types of weapons categories.  This information highlights 
how quickly DMNCs can respond to new pressures and forecasts, reorganize their 
strategies, and structure and move into a new era of defense contracting.   
 
Table 1.   Number of Top DMNC Merger Announcements25  
2. Civilian Sectors 
With defense spending graphics looking more like a roller-coaster trajectory, it 
only seemed natural that DMNCs would look for sources of revenue that would be 
somewhat stable and help mitigate the peaks and valleys of defense budgeting.  For those 
DMNCs that were not involved in the civilian sectors prior to the “last supper,” it only 
became evident that they should diversify their portfolio and investigate other avenues of 
revenue.  Some DMNCs sold off their defense sectors as discussed above and solely 
relied on their civilian sectors.  However, those who kept their defense sectors realized 
                                                 
25  Jennifer Grant, “Market Perception of Defense Mergers in the United States: 1990–2006, A Case of 
Event Studies” (MBA, Naval Postgraduate School), 1, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA475824 (accessed 
November 11, 2010), 2. 
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the benefits that civilian sectors could offer.  With continual work and revenue from their 
civilian sectors, DMNCs are able to keep their specialized labor force and reduce the 
possibility of atrophic effects on the skills or their work force during an absence of 
defense contracting.  This allowed them to invest in research and development therefore 
maintaining their ability to be on the leading edge of technology.  Corporations not only 
shifted to civilian sectors but also focused on what is deemed “dual-use” technology.  
This type of technology, such as specialized processors or display screens, can be sold in 
the civilian sector and also used in defense projects.  Such capabilities allowed DMNCs 
to continue their operations and specialization even when defense spending was cut.  It 
has been found that, with such a shift in strategies, the defense sector is now becoming 
less defense intensive in nature and looking for commercial applications at a greater rate 
than before.26 
3. Internationalization 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated, “Defense manufacturing is a global 
business.”27  To a certain extent this is true; however, as the world continues to globalize 
and foreign competitors enter new markets, it is becoming almost impossible for even the 
once autarkic U.S. DMNCs not to internationalize.  Stephen Brooks states that, “no state, 
including the great powers, can now effectively remain on the cutting edge in military 
technology if it does not pursue significant internationalization in the production of 
weaponry.”28  It is the general agreement from both economists and security analysts  
that this statement is true; however, what does this mean, exactly?  How will 
internationalization affect the operations of DMNCs and precisely what risks arise from 
such endeavors? 
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a. Why Internationalize? 
The benefits to internationalization are numerous and affect just about 
every facet of operation within a corporation.  It not only helps to streamline supply 
chains and logistics, but also presents opportunities to excel and compete in multiple 
areas.  With corporations looking outside their national borders for new sources of ideas 
and revenue, the U.S. government in turn hopes to reap the benefits of the cost 
optimization through internationalization.29  To best understand the opportunities that 
internationalization of DMNCs provide, this section will analyze a selective amount of 
critical areas that have been known to drive DMNCs outside of their host national borders 
and into foreign territory.  While there are a plethora of reasons as to why DMNCs 
internationalize, these were chosen due to their applicability to the argument of this thesis 
and that they are well within the scope of this research. 
 New Markets:  With globalization comes the development of new markets.  
While most countries cannot compete with the defense spending of the United 
States, this still present opportunities to increase revenue sales and also attain 
increased economies of scale through larger production runs.  This not only 
creates benefits to the corporation but also reduces the overall cost of defense 
articles for the United States.  In so, DMNCs can expand every part of their 
operations from defense articles to their civilian products.30 
 Streamlined Logistics: The Chief Economist of the Department of the Navy 
stated “The defense industrial base is global in scope and there is an 
increasing trend toward global supply chains to share innovation and risk, and 
to develop interoperable equipment.”31  By expanding their logistics chain, 
DMNCs are able to locate within key areas to improve their production lines.  
By analyzing the costs of operations in different locations, DMNCs can 
choose to either subcontract or develop infrastructure in foreign territories to 
                                                 
29  Markusen and Costigan, Arming the Future: A Defense Industry for the 21st Century, 442: 310. 
30  Guay, Globalization and its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base, 37. 
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reduce operational costs.  Perhaps this is in the of building components in one 
country and assembling them in another.  Either way, corporations look for 
opportunities to exploit various incentives in certain locations so as to reduce 
cost and improve future operations.32 
 Access to New Technology:  By delving into new nations, DMNCs open their 
operations to work with and develop new technology with foreign 
corporations.  Through this type of strategy, DMNCs can help to mitigate cost 
and risk and create symbiotic relationships with foreign corporations therefore 
developing many unseen benefits.33  This might not have major applicability 
to the defense sectors of DMNCs considering collaboration projects are highly 
politicized decisions by governments; however, the civilian sectors of these 
DMNCs can truly enjoy the benefits of collaboration. 
b. Inherent Risks From Internationalizing 
The 2002 National Security Strategy states “Today, the distinction 
between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing.  In a globalized world, events 
beyond America’s borders have a greater impact than inside them.”34  While 
internationalization appears to present many opportunities, it also causes more pressure 
and dynamics that increase the complexity of every day operations.  With the expansion 
of internationalization, multiple dynamics and challenges are created for DMNCs to deal 
with.  A sample of some of the most critical pressures that DMNCs are exposed to is 
listed below. 
 Displacement of Technology to Foreign Soil: While there are many protective 
measures within the United States to forbid the transfer of sensitive material, 
there are still types of technology that is not covered by these forms of 
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protection that give foreign countries an advantage.35  As foreign technology 
continues to flow across the borders, foreign corporations and, therefore, 
future competitors gain access to not only the technology but also the skilled 
work force that U.S. DMNCs train and supply.36  This notion can also be 
extrapolated to incorporate the vast amounts of infrastructure that DMNCs 
provide in foreign nations.  
 Foreign Political Pressure: By shifting production into foreign lands, DMNCs 
lend themselves to the decisions of foreign governments in which they must 
abide.  Theodore Moran writes “The contemporary movement toward 
globalization opens the door in peacetime to foreign influence, foreign 
control, and foreign domination.”37  In some cases, DMNCs may have to shift 
production or information to foreign countries to gain political favor and 
possibly win contracts with foreign nationals.38  U.S. DMNCs are at a slight 
disadvantage when operating in a foreign country considering that they are not 
a part of the host national scheme.  This may cause DMNCs to have to work 
harder to gain favor from foreign countries so as to gain the trust and 
commerce of the foreign government.  Analysis shows that policy conflicts 
can develop between the corporation and the nations in which they deal.39  
Therefore the continual operation of corporations in multiple nations raises the 
likelihood that political confrontation between the host nation, the foreign 
nation and the corporation may occur.40 
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 Dependency on International Sources: As DMNCs continue to branch out into 
foreign nations, they develop a level of dependency on that nation and its 
resources.  In 1991 the Office of Technology Assessment concluded: “almost 
all US weapons systems contained component parts from foreign sources, 
predominantly incorporating dual-use technologies with both military and 
civilian applications, such as micro electronic chips, composite materials, and 
flat-panel displays.”41  A Department of Defense (DoD) analysis in 1988 
concluded that “foreign dependencies in technologies essential to defense 
production are inherently risky, and minimizing them should be a Department 
of Defense and national priority.”42  Whether or not this dependency is 
through subcontracting or production in a foreign nation, defense articles to a 
certain degree are dependent on parts of a production chain residing within 
foreign nations.   
The effect from dependence on a foreign nations’ procurement of 
specialized items can be crippling.  The French witnessed such agony due to their 
reliance on foreign technology during their development nuclear weapons.  From 1964 to 
1966, the United States refused to allow IBM to export “high performance” computers to 
the French Atomic Energy Commission.  Due to such resistance from the Americans, this 
caused the Hydrogen Bomb program to cease its progress.43  The technology held by the 
United States caused the French to be incapable at the time to produce the weapon of 
desire.  Their progress was hindered not by their government or a lack of desire, but by a 
foreign government.  Because of their dependence, the United States had direct control 
on the progress of France’s nuclear weapons development.  The French therefore had to 
wait until their own technological base caught up and was able to produce capable means 
of developing the weapon at hand.  While a couple of years may not seem like much, in a 
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race for security and competitive edge, a couple years could be the difference between 
success and failure.  Therein lies the problem of depending on foreign technology 
procurement.  This was not just a lesson for the French, but a beacon of truth to all 
nations that the continual reliance or over-dependence on a single source of critical 
components outside of national boundaries could be detrimental to the overall success of 
national interests. 
B. OBSERVED BEHAVIORS 
In the previous sections, we saw the dynamics that DMNCs have faced and the 
effects from internationalization.  To extrapolate from the list of inherent risks due to 
internationalization, we will now turn to previous research by other political scientists.  
Three key understanding have been found that not only highlight possible dangers but 
also emphasize the reality of DMNC vulnerability to foreign pressure.   
1. Telling Tales of Waning Nationalism 
As has been previously discussed, with the ever-growing expansion of 
internationalization, it is becoming more important for DMNCs to diversify and reach 
new markets.44  As corporations continue to internationalize, many authors have 
questioned whether or not MNCs regard nation-states as obstacles in their path for market 
dominance.  There is an ever-growing fear that while defense corporations have host 
nations, their allegiance to their host nation may weaken due to political constrictions.  
An analysis performed by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) quotes a top 
defense executive as say “the best thing the government could do for our international 
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dispersed productions and competitive international nature, corporations will fight any 
restriction on their ability to globalize and reap benefits even if this is to the chagrin of 
the host nation.46 
These notions and observations serve to highlight the fact that the ties between 
DMNCs and their host nation have in fact thinned as they continue to globalize.  Dealing 
with new governments, pressures and international competition, DMNCs are more likely 
today to act against host national interests than when they were autarkic and located 
solely within national borders.  This only gives a sense of reality in that DMNCs under 
the right conditions may acquiesce to foreign national interests in hopes to increase 
benefits and profits. 
2. Arms as Political Influence 
DMNCs by their vary nature, directly control the technological capabilities of the 
United States’ forces.  Due to their constant funding and unswerving aptitude in research 
and advancement they have been able to provide the United States with state of the art 
warfare components.  Leading the industry in military weapons and procurement, U.S. 
DMNCs have been the pinnacle of defense institutions across the globe and have in most 
every sector lead the industry in technological advancements.47  The ability to not only 
supply but directly affect the technological aptitude of the most powerful country in the 
world calls upon a true understanding of their influence and power.  In the 1980s, due to 
the very nature and structure of the U.S. defense industrial base, it became evident that 
the industry and not the state had control on the output of weapons technology and 
sophistication.48  Left to corporate decisions, DMNCs directly control the output of 
military research and capability.   
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Such a well-established institution, like that of the U.S. industrial base is highly 
sought after by other nations.  To develop and maintain a highly advanced military 
industrial complex a country must continually provide funding to support highly 
specialized labor, advanced machinery and capable institutions to further research and 
development.  For those countries who began such costly endeavors years ago, stand 
today as the top defense complexes in the world to include the United States, the 
European Union, and Russia, to a certain extent.  For others, the high entry cost into such 
a market remains almost impossible for new and developing countries to catch up or even 
produce capable means of supplying their own military.  Thus, these three complexes 
stand as monopolistic corporations in the international market.    
It therefore stands to reason that those nations with such highly developed 
military industrial complexes have greater capability of supplying and producing highly 
effective weapons of war over those nations that do not.  For those nations that lack the 
means to create and maintain such a capability, they become indebted and dependent on 
foreign nations to provide such weapons and articles as needed.49  In so lies the problem 
that war and security are never in short supply and, therefore, the means to protect and 
advance ones national interests are ever present.  With the continual demand for weapons 
throughout the world, the international market provides avenues for increased markets 
and vast possibilities for profit.   
Considering that the export of weapons and munitions is a highly politicized and 
in most cases controlled by the host nation, it can be seen how the comparative advantage 
of weapons procurement can provide countries with political leverage over another.  
Thomas Wheelock defines this type of leverage as the “manipulation of the arms transfer 
relationship in order to coerce or induce a recipient-state to conform its policy or actions 
to the desires of the supplier-state.”50  In John Sislin’s research of such effects, he found 
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that the United States attempted to use weapons as a source of leverage 191 times.51  He 
goes on to show that certain characteristics and situations provide a higher probability of 
success over others; however, it is important to note that the use of arms as influence is 
ever present and a highly profitable source of leverage for the United States over other 
nations that do not possess the level of technological capability as the U.S. defense 
industrial base.   
This use of defense aid as manipulation or “leverage” can be in the form or 
positive or punitive measures.  In 1986, President Reagan proposed to the Philippines that 
if the elections were fair and reforms were made, then he would propose to Congress 
additional military aid to reward the country.  While this was a form of positive 
reinforcement, that same year, President Reagan threatened to cut off all aid to the 
Philippines if violence broke out over the election of President Marcos.52  In the case of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident the United States enacted an arms embargo on the 
PRC as a direct form of punishment for what was perceived by the United States as acts 
against humanity.53  Some forms of leverage are more effective than others, but this only 
highlights the fact that the every day operations of DMNCs are highly politicized due to 
their powerful products and the world’s desire for them. 
3. Rebalancing of the Three Markets 
An important observation in assessing the true intentions of DMNCs is of 
Jonathan Galloway, who addressees among many things, the global implications of 
DMNCs by differentiating the driving mechanisms for these corporations.54  He explains 
that the basic needs and interactions between DMNCs are different based on their level of 
dependency on foreign sales and operations.  DMNCs that depend more on foreign sales 
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than military sales are more apt to react to foreign market pressures.55  However, while 
this is true, he highlights that even if military contracting is only a fifth of a corporation’s 
revenue, the DMNC cannot stand to lose that income and is more likely to work harder to 
maintain it despite it being a smaller part of the corporation’s overall revenue.  Therefore 
he concludes that all DMNCs are dependent to some extent, on the three markets: 
governmental, foreign and domestic civilian.  He argues that these DMNCs will take any 
action necessary to preserve the balance among these markets regardless their individual 
percentages.56  Galloway states “it stands to reason that their managements will be 
interested in preserving the dynamic equilibrium between these markets.  If the 
equilibrium between these markets is upset, then the consequences for the firm may 
become unacceptable.57 
4. Boeing McDonnell Douglas Example 
Coupling the arguments of Galloway with the arguments that MNCs are 
becoming stateless as they internationalize, one can start to see the plausibility in 
DMNCs acting to mitigate sanctions from a foreign country like China.  This sort of 
situation is not an unlikely scenario considering that DMNCs in the past have been 
caught between their host nation and foreign national interests.  The well-documented 
Boeing McDonnell Douglas merger highlights this very argument. 
In 1997, Boeing made a bold move to buy and merge with their long-standing 
U.S. rival, McDonnell Douglas, another U.S. DMNC that specialized in aerospace 
manufacturing and defense contracting.  Although the U.S. authorities had approved the 
merger, the European Union (EU) ruled that the merger was not in the EU’s best interests 
and demanded that Boeing make changes.  Both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are 
based out of the United States; however, the EU was concerned that the combined power 
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of the two companies would hinder the European aeronautics corporation, Airbus.  Since 
Airbus is 80% owned by EADS and BAE with the other 20% (both of which are DMNCs 
of the EU) it was speculated that such a merger would cause Boeing to gain a larger 
competitive edge and would hurt their own DMNCs in the long run.58  Boeing first 
argued that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, not the EU, should take the lead in 
investigating the deal and its legitimacy.  The EU went forward with its own commission 
and unanimously voted that the merger be blocked by any means necessary.  Faced with 
the threat of EU pressure to band together and only buy planes from Airbus, Boeing 
acquiesced to the concerns of the EU and changed the conditions of the merger so as to 
satisfy the EU.59  Even though the United States demanded that Boeing maintain its 
original deals and had a legitimate reason for stating that the original terms were fair, 
Boeing feared the loss of market share in Europe and, therefore, believed the foreign 
government’s interests were in their own best interests.  
This incident is significant for several reasons.  This showcases how an 
international organization was able to pressure two U.S. corporations to conform to their 
interests and not act solely on the interests of the corporation.  They were able to create 
enough pressure on Boeing and ensure that Boeing conceded to their desires.  Second, 
political leaders ranging from President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore to 
France’s President Jacques Chirac, strongly advocated the position of their respective 
companies and regulatory authorities.  This only highlights exactly how political the 
process is and that it was not left solely in the hands of the DMNCs to decipher.  Third, 
as mentioned above, the rest of the world perceived this move by the EU as a way to 
protect the European corporation Airbus.  This was not because Boeing did not make a 
good product.  It was because of nationalistic reasons that differentiated Airbus from 
Boeing, which is a dynamic that foreign DMNCs must fight hard to resolve and 
overcome.   
Still, the largest point is that the deepening of integration into other parts of the 
world over the years has transferred more regulatory powers from host authorities to 
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foreign nations.  Companies like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman and UTC will find that their civilian actions, regardless of how small, will 
invite the attention of the international world. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
As defense spending has augmented and diminished over the years, DMNCs have 
shifted focus and attention to different methods of maintaining profit and competitive 
edge.  Whether this is through mergers, civilian operations or internationalization, the 
dynamics that face DMNCs have altered the way the U.S. industrial complex operates 
today.  While there are significant benefits to such actions, the existence of inherent risks 
provides grave concerns for the future.  It is through these inherent risks that China may 
attempt to exploit DMNCs through the actions of sanctions.  As can be seen, DMNCs 
have opened themselves to foreign influence through their internationalization and have 
become more entwined with foreign operations than before.  It is apparent that DMNCs 
are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than in the past. 
Past research shows that not only are DMNCs highly politicized, but also play an 
important role in international politics.  No longer are their operations regarded or 
controlled by just their host nation, but are now a part of international debate and review.  
What is most alarming is that the multifaceted operations of the DMNCs drive many 
different interests and priorities.  As Galloway discussed, it is likely that DMNCs will 
take every action possible to maintain and preserve the equilibrium or balance between 
the three markets: “Governmental, foreign, and domestic civilian.” 60  If a country like 
China were to engage and or hinder one of these three markets, it is likely that the 
DMNCs would respond to mitigate or compensate for such actions. 
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III. DANGEROUS DEPENDENCIES AND PRACTICES 
As was discussed previously, DMNCs have opened themselves to foreign 
pressure and control.  While there are various ways in which internationalization affects 
the U.S. defense industrial base, there are two areas in which DMNCs could be most 
vulnerable to Chinese sanctions and pressure: foreign subcontracting and the respective 
civilian sectors of the DMNCs.61 After chasing cheaper logistics routes and developing a 
global civilian sector, DMNCs have become entwined with foreign markets and 
governments.  In the following sections this chapter will analyze these two areas and 
decipher whether or not they pose a threat or could be used against the United States. 
A. THE MUDDLED ART OF SUBCONTRACTING 
Subcontracting or otherwise known as outsourcing by some is defined by John 
Holmes as a strategy in which “the firm offering the subcontract requests another 
independent enterprise to undertake the production or carry out the processing of the 
material, component, part or assembly for it.”62  This strategy is not new since it has been 
performed for over three decades; however, it has become ever more vital for MNCs to 
employ such techniques with the increasing challenges from internationalization.63  
Subcontracting is a multilevel operation that ranges from software, materials to 
concepts and designs.  In the case of the U.S. defense industry, the overall project or 
product is a highly sophisticated system that composes of many different subsystems and 
parts.  In this case, the U.S. government may contract a specific DMNC to develop and or 
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orchestrate that particular weapon or product.  Taking the lead in the project, this DMNC 
is known as the prime contractor and will set forth developing an operational structure 
that will best employ the requirements of the U.S. government while maximizing overall 
profit.  Even though U.S. DMNCs are extensive, in today’s weapon systems they can ill 
afford to develop the entire system on their own.  Instead these DMNCs will look to 
subcontract key portions to other corporations.  This form of subcontracting is known as 
second-tier contracting.  If that second-tier subcontractor then turns and subcontracts a 
portion of their task to someone else, the new corporation introduced to the project is 
known as a third tier subcontractor and so on.   
To help illustrate the use of this terminology, we will briefly analyze the scale of 
operations and contracting in an example aircraft jet production.  The U.S. government 
gives a contract to a company like Boeing, now the prime contractor, to develop a new jet 
fighter with certain specifications.64  Boeing then develops a plan and subcontracts to 
companies in Japan, England, Canada, and others who specialize in their respective areas 
and who provide the most incentives to receive the contract.  Usually this subcontracting 
is a task to develop a certain component or set of software.  In this example Boeing 
subcontracts to a company in Japan to develop the wing for the jet.65  This contract is 
known as a second-tier contract and the Japanese company now reports to Boeing to 
ensure the wings are completed to specifications as described by Boeing.  The Japanese 
company then subcontracts a third-tier contract to a company in India to help develop 
retracting motors for the wing flaps.  This Indian company now reports to the Japanese 
company and their agreement is known as a third tier contract.  The Indian company may 
need a certain type of semiconductor to develop the motor within specification and will  
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subcontract a company in China now a fourth tier contract.  This sort of evolution can 
continue to almost incalculable levels with varying degrees of foreign assistance in the 
project. 
1. Why Subcontract 
The art of subcontracting seems difficult in that the prime contractor has to 
orchestrate thousands of tasks of which many are outside of their organization.  In foreign 
subcontracting, not only does the prime contractor have to deal with different business 
styles and organizations, but they also have to face time zone differences, cultural 
differences, currency exchange rate differences and many more.  This not only requires 
the utmost attention by the prime contractor but if not maintained can cause extended 
timelines and or complete project failure.  With so many added dynamics in foreign 
subcontracting, why then do DMNCs subcontract? 
Through advancements in science, technological capability has allotted firms a 
profitable opportunity in which to explore the globe for cost optimization in supply 
chains.  Through the development of super freighters and containerization, costs in 
shipments overseas decreased 70 percent from 1980s to 1996.66  Advancements in 
communications have exponentially increased corporate integration through the use of 
cell phones and web conferencing.  The cost to make a phone call from New York to 
London in 1930 has since decreased by a factor of 1500.67  While these are only a couple 
of examples where technology has lowered the cost to operations internationally, it is 
unfathomable to comprehend complete corporate integration or international supply 
chains without lower costs in global connectivity.  Therefore due to these types of 
advancements, corporations are now able to viably look beyond their national borders 
and compare foreign corporations with that of domestic corporations. 
Because the global market is larger than that of a domestic market, corporations 
now have more to choose from.  Because of the larger pool of potential corporations to 
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subcontract with, corporations have access to larger pools of technology, quality of 
production, costs optimization, and others.  No longer are corporations limited to the 
technological capability of their respective country but can now access varying degrees of 
sophistication across the globe.  Stephen Kobrin states that:  
“In industries such as telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, 
semiconductors, and aerospace…States are now faced with a discrete 
decision rather than a marginal trade-offs: participate in the world 
economy or forgo technological development…The choices are to 
compete transnationally or forgo the next generation of microprocessors, 
pharmaceuticals or telecommunications technology entirely.”68   
In the defense sectors, these advancements are instrumental and cannot be 
overlooked.  Their success in being a part of the top of the line technology has a direct 
affect on the capability and relative power of their respective nation, in this case the 
United States. 
Along with technological advancement, corporations also seek cost optimization.  
Corporations increasingly search for locations in which to reduce the overall costs of 
operations and logistics.  Strategically, corporations will choose locations best suited to 
enable the area’s greatest advantages.  This could be in the form of technology, taxes, 
labor costs, or political incentives.  According to Stephen Brooks:  
“Firms increasingly seek locations where they can combine their own 
mobile assets most efficiently with an immobile resources they need to 
produce goods and services for the markets they want to serve.  As a 
consequence, firm split up the production process into very specific 
activities (such as finance, research and development, accounting, training, 
parts production, distribution), or segments of these activities, with each of 
them carried out by affiliates in locations best suited to the particular 
activity.  This process creates an international interim firm division of 
labor and the growing integration of international production that 
works.”69 
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Whether or not it is for cost optimization incentives or for technological access, 
corporations are continually seeking the outside world in subcontracting.  Even with all 
the dynamics involved in international supply chains and the dependence of foreign 
corporations, it appears as though the benefits outweigh the risks.  In conclusion to a 
United Nations report it was found that “in today’s global rising world economy, the 
increasing competitive pressures faced by firms of all sizes impel more and more of them 
to establish an international portfolio of locational assets to remain competitive.”70 
2. Is Subcontracting a Common Practice? 
While we have seen the advantages to international subcontracting, one of the 
more important questions in this research is whether or not international subcontracting is 
significant in modern operations and more importantly in defense operations.  It was 
found in a World Bank survey that international outsourcing increased about 30% 
between 1987 and 1995 due to growing international competition and restructuring of 
corporate strategic growth.71  Continually corporations are utilizing the benefits of 
international subcontracting as a source to gain advantages over other competitors.  
Figure 2 shows exactly how much has been invested in foreign outsourcing over the span 
of 15 years.  It is easy to see that foreign subcontracting has become a general strategy in 
business and has increased at an exponential rate. 
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Figure 2.   Foreign Outsourcing by U.S. Manufacturing Corporations72 
Defense corporations in particular have become accustomed to such foreign 
endeavors.  Michael Wynne, the Undersecretary of Defense Acquisitions stated “about 
40% of machine tools used on U.S. weapons systems come from foreign suppliers.”73  
Concerns have arisen over the past couple decades as to whether or not the growing 
amount of foreign subcontracting within the defense sector is healthy.  Beginning in the 
1980s the Department of Defense (DoD) conducted an extensive amount of studies to 
answer that exact question.  Roderick Vawter, in 1986, analyzed 10 of these reports and 
concluded that:  
Significant foreign dependencies exist in major weapons systems.  The 
phenomenon is widespread and probably exists in most defense systems.  
This conclusion is the consensus of a number of studies, which, directly or 
indirectly, addressed the question of foreign source dependencies as they 
relate to national defense in the production of military hardware.  The 
dependencies spread across a wide range of production inputs.  They 
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include a few instances of total systems purchased offshore, such as 
chemical protective suits purchased from England.  They progressed down 
the production chain to include major subsystems such as heads up 
displays, electronic assemblies, and electronic components including 
semiconductors and ceramic packages.74 
 Since 1986, it appears as though this consensus has not changed.  In 1991 an 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report concluded that “almost all U.S. weapons 
systems contained component parts from foreign sources, predominantly incorporating 
dual use technologies with both military and civilian applications, such as micro 
electronic chips, composite materials, and flat-panel displays.”75  Analyzing the M1 
Abrams tank, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report concluded that “foreign sources 
of supply, manufacturing, and technology were abound in both the commercial and 
defense sectors.”  That same report went on to show that significant foreign 
subcontracting could be found on multiple items within the M1 Abrams tank ranging 
from highly sophisticated ballistic computer software systems to lower end seals.76 
From the information above it can be clearly stated that DMNCs do, to varying 
degrees, depend on foreign subcontracting as a common practice.  It might not be the 
sophisticated equipment or the highly specialized and “sensitive materials” that one 
would be inclined to believe but is instead the general components that are typically 
civilian in nature.  This is to include bolts, screens, displays, microprocessors, etc…  
While these are not detrimental to the overall capability of the platform in production, 
they do play a large role in the production cost, and timing.  These labor intensive, 
technically minimal tasks were subcontracted most likely for their lower cost guarantee 
from the subcontractor, thus reducing the overall cost of the project.  Therefore they play 
a large part in the efficiency of the project and the margin of profit. 
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3. Subcontracting and the Problems With Regard to Data Collection 
It is not so much a risk that defense corporations are subcontracting highly 
sensitive material or transferring secret information through their foreign interaction, but 
that the second and third tier subcontracting levels are creating dependencies on foreign 
nations that could be a source of vulnerability.77  The prime contractors involved in 
American defense procurement are still national characters consisting usually of 
corporations like the five DMNCs involved in the Taiwan arms sales.  At this level they 
are given the overall project of developing the weapon at hand.  These prime contractors 
in turn look to trusted corporations to develop certain large-scale components.  These 
second-tier contractors are usually of no concern, considering that they are under the 
scrutiny of the prime contractor and must report to that DMNC; however, what happens 
in the next tiers of subcontracting?  
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact extent of international 
subcontracting when analyzing further tiers of subcontracting.  It was concluded by the 
Information Technologies Association of America in 2003 that it is virtually impossible 
for U.S. DMNCs “to create, much less certify, an authoritative list of countries of origin 
of the hundreds or sometimes thousands of discrete components in a particular computer 
or telecommunications switch or radar control unit.”78  There are two general reasons 
why this is true.  First, there are thousands of different companies involved in 
subcontracting, as will be shown in the next section.  More importantly, it is not the 
second tier that is hard to track and authorize but the third, fourth, fifth, etc.  This spider 
web of subcontractors is not the direct choice of the prime contractor.  Instead, like my 
example before, the second-tier contractor looks for someone else and that corporation in 
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turn looks for another and so on.  The second reason is the inability to access foreign 
databases.  In most reports the limiting factor was not the cooperation of the U.S. 
corporations but the international corporations.  United States rules, regulations and 
insight are not applicable when dealing with foreign companies.  This will be highlighted 
further in the next section. 
a. HARM, ADCAP, VERDIN Report 
As was discussed previously, in the early 1980s the Department of 
Defense (DOD) undertook multiple studies aimed and determining the degree of foreign 
sourcing.  Continually, the reports pointed out that there were significant foreign 
dependencies through foreign subcontracting; however, none of the reports directly 
ascertained the exact level.79  After intense criticism from both Congress and the GAO, 
the Commerce Department in 1988 responded by conducting, “the first known 
comprehensive analysis of sourcing by weapons system at lower tier subcontractor levels, 
both domestic and foreign.”80  The study’s primary focus was to identify foreign sourced 
items, which were defined as “materials, parts, components, or cell assemblies 
manufactured, assembled, or otherwise processed outside of the United States.”81  In this 
assessment, being published in 1992, the Commerce Department analyzed three U.S. 
Naval defense systems to ascertain the exact amount of foreign subcontracting utilized in 
the production.  These weapons were the HARM missile, the Verdin communication 
system and the Mk 48 ADCAP Torpedo.  They were chosen due to their varying level of 
sophistication to ensure that all aspects of the value chain could me monitored and 
determined.    
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After all surveys were accounted for, it was found that over 15,000 
corporations were identified at the subcontractor level, with 11,638 corporations still 
actively supplying the prime contractor in production of the finalized product.82  The fact 
that these weapon systems took 15,000 different corporations to create the final product 
only highlights the level of complexity and scope in producing modern weapons of today.  
It was also found that the Mk 48 Torpedo was the least globalized system, with only 5% 
coming from foreign subcontractors at both the second-tier and third-tier levels.  The 
second most globalized system was the HARM missile with 4.7% coming from second-
tier contracting and 17.6% coming from third tier subcontractors.  Finally, it was the 
electronic intensive Verdin communication system that was most globalized.  This 
system had 40% coming for foreign second-tier subcontracting.83  In total, the Verdin 
system drew on 163 foreign subcontractors from 26 different countries including the 
PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.84 
There were many problems with the assessment in that the surveys that 
were sent to corporations were not mandatory and, therefore, not required to be filled out.  
Although there were thousands that responded, 27% did not.85  This included second, 
third and fourth tier subcontractors.  This, therefore, produced incomplete data across the 
analysis.  The second problem with the assessment was that once the survey reached a 
foreign subcontractor, further research was ceased.86  Most likely, those foreign 
subcontractors subcontracted; however, the report does not show this and, therefore, it 
can be concluded that it is highly probable that more foreign dependencies exist than was 
showcased in the report.  To further this, this study did not look at launch computers or 
software systems associated to the weapons systems in the project and did not analyze 
any other support systems that are associated with the overall project.      
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Therefore, in the end, it is impossible to know the full extent of third tier 
foreign subcontracting and due to the complexity of the supply chain logistics of modern 
technology it is almost impossible to adequately identify all parties taking part in the 
development and procurement of U.S. weapons.  This fact alone should underscore how 
vulnerable U.S. DMNCs are to foreign subcontracting.  Do these corporations actually 
know who makes their parts and components?  According to U.S. Official reports, it is 
impossible to actually ascertain such information.  Even with the concerted efforts of the 
Commerce Department, this endeavor fell short and could only point out and verify 
previous reports that U.S. defense subcontracting is dependent on foreign supply. 
4. How Does This Apply to China? 
While there is no modern day information or complete analysis that dictates the 
amount of defense subcontracting to China specifically, the Commerce Report did 
highlight their involvement in the three systems.  The PRC contributed $8 million, or 
11% of the fourth tier subcontracting in the Mk 48 ADCAP torpedo, standing as the third 
largest foreign contributor at this level.87  This included the supply of lead frames and 
resistors for the HARM missile and the ADCAP torpedo.88  Hong Kong provided 
assembly, headers, ceramic pieces, and parts packages for the HARM missile and 
electronic components and tantalum bearing ore for the Verdin communication system.89 
In this instance, we see that the PRC was a part of production of three prominent 
and still used weapons of the U.S. Navy.  This was at a time when relations were still 
strained with Beijing over the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 and the Chinese market was 
no where near as strong as it is today, now boasting a second place in overall GDP.  
Considering that China’s economy has exponentially increased since 1992, it can be 
conceived that China has become a larger part in foreign sourcing and subcontracting.  
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While there is no specific data to numerically prove this, logically it can be understood 
that China has become a more integral part of supply chains around the world to include 
third, fourth and fifth tier subcontracting for defense articles.   
While it becomes clear that China is a part of U.S. defense subcontracting, the 
important question in this equation is how can China effectively use this to place pressure 
on U.S. DMNCs?  It is not so much a matter of foreign involvement that affect the 
security of these corporations, but how foreign influence can affect these corporations in 
their endeavors.  For the threatened sanctions and pressure to be effective, they must have 
a viable means in which to present major concerns for these DMNCs. 
a. Profit Collapse 
The third, fourth and fifth tier subcontracting tasks are usually low scale 
productions, and resource procurement.  They are not highly sophisticated or 
technological in nature.  Therefore, the type of aid that Chinese corporations add to the 
value chain is not in the realm of scientific advancement.  The U.S. projects do not rely 
on Chinese state-of-the-art capabilities but instead rely on their cheap labor and low 
production costs.  It is assumed that corporations chose Chinese subcontractors because 
they offered the specified product at a cheaper cost than other corporations.  Therefore, 
the withholding of Chinese products could in effect raise costs and expand production 
times for U.S. DMNCs.  This does not assume that the United States would now be 
unable to replicate all of the technologies, parts, and components used in defense-related 
production by Chinese subcontractors, but that the U.S. corporations would have to find 
other means and methods in which to procure these products and would therefore have to 
raise production costs, and expand the production timeline.    
Even though this connection seems simple, it can lead to other effects 
further down the supply chain.  We cannot take the Chinese market for granted and ask 
“how much would it cost to replicate what comes from China?” but instead try to 
understand how the exclusion of an entire market, especially as large as China would 
have on all facets of production.  Many have studied the options of complete domestic 
production for U.S. defense articles.  As will be discussed later, the Buy American 
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movement was such a response by congress; however, most in the DoD have vehemently 
fought against such acts.  Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was quoted saying that 
such actions, “would deny to U.S. forces critical technologies and capabilities available 
only, or most economically, from non-U.S. sources.”90 
It is not just a matter of shear profit calculation, but with defense budgets 
shrinking, these added costs to projects could ultimately affect the level of output and the 
overall amount of projects contracted by the U.S. government.  It is somewhat far fetched 
to believe that the overall refusal of Chinese subcontractors would lead to fewer projects 
by the U.S. government; however, it is undeniable in arguing that it would overall 
increase costs and, therefore, cause a reduction in profit margins for U.S. corporations.  
The affect of Chinese refusals to subcontract would lead all the way from fourth tier 
contractors straight to the U.S. government.  
A counterargument to this is that such a cutback by the PRC would cause 
a large loss of revenue within the country.  It can be assumed that if China were to 
conduct such an action, they would be hurting many of their corporations and could in 
effect hurt their own economic gains.  This action could be considered “biting the nose in 
spite of the face.”  Whether or not this option is sufficient for China to enact, this option 
is viable and could be utilized to not only to hinder production efficiency but also cut into 
the profit margin of DMNCs thus creating pressure on the corporations.  While this could 
be an effective means, it appears to be inefficient. 
B. DMNC CIVILIAN PRACTICES 
As was discussed in a previous section, U.S. defense expenditures have fluctuated 
over the years, therefore creating instable revenue projections.91  To help mitigate such 
effects, most defense corporations have relied on their civilian sectors as an alternative 
source of revenue.  The civilian practices give the defense corporations the ability to 
expand and thrive even in times when defense spending is low.  With a constant source of 
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funding from the civilian revenue, DMNCs are able to keep their highly trained labor 
force and ensure production lines are maintained.  The existence of a strong civilian 
sector not only gives defense corporations increased revenue during times of low defense 
spending but also in turn affords defense corporations the ability to fund continued 
research thus improving their competitive edge and technological capability.    
Unlike defense articles, products from civilian sectors are able to flow across 
borders relatively unchecked.  The freedom of commerce allows civilian sectors of the 
defense corporations to extend their supply chain logistics across oceans without the prior 
approval of the U.S. president as it is with the defense articles.  The internationalization 
of these products allows for the civilian sectors of the defense corporations to create 
efficiencies in production, increase economies of scale, and access to new markets.92  
Because of such opportunities, it has almost become a necessity for corporations to 
internationalize to maintain their competitive edge.   
While opportunities do exist from internationalization, so does risk.  The 
continued operations in foreign countries create new pressures and difficulties for these 
corporations.93  It is not that they are just American companies, but that their operations 
are tied to the political ramifications of being a defense corporation and a national asset 
to their host nation.  Therefore, the continual operation of these corporations in multiple  
nations raises the likelihood that political confrontation between the foreign nations and 
the corporation may occur.94  The response from the PRC over the sales to Taiwan 
highlights that exact problem.   
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Considering that all the defense corporations from the Taiwan arms sale are 
multinational in their operations and have civilian sectors that extend the globe, China 
has an ability to sanction portions of the exposed civilian sectors of the defense 
corporations.95  Unlike the defense sectors, civilian sectors look at foreign areas as a new 
market in which to gain new customers.96  Therefore, to be able to understand the 
effectiveness of sanctions against the civilian sectors, it is important to register how much 
these defense corporations rely on their civilian sectors and how much of a role China 
plays in the calculus of their future prospect.  
1. How Much Do DMNCs Depend on Their Civilian Sectors 
 
Table 2.   Defense Revenue Versus Civilian Revenue  
(Figures in millions of U.S. dollars) 97 
In analyzing Table 2, one can see that both Boeing and UTC show a large reliance 
on their civilian sector.  According to their financial data, both companies rely heavily 
upon their civilian sectors’ total revenue to maintain operations.  Lockheed Martin, 
Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon have a significant amount of civilian revenue; 
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however, their business structure does not rely as heavily on civilian revenue and would 
therefore not be in as much jeopardy if sanctions were imposed on their civilian sectors.  
For Boeing and UTC, 49% and 83% are sufficiently significant that they require their 
civilian sectors’ revenue and would, therefore, be extremely vulnerable to the Chinese 
sanctions.   
Boeing sells commercial aircraft to the Chinese Airlines and UTC sells Otis 
elevators and Carrier brand heating and air-conditioning in China.98  For Boeing, a 
complication in the Chinese market would severely hurt their civilian revenue.  Over the 
next two decades, Boeing expects China to spend $400 billion to purchase around 3,770 
planes from certain manufacturers, therefore making China the second largest 
commercial aircraft market in the world.99  According to UTC’s CEO, Louis Chenevert, 
“[China’s market] feels really good right now,” adding that he sees no evidence of 
China’s market slowing down and noted that the company’s Otis elevators were up by 
double digits, and orders for its Carrier air conditioning systems were “starting to come 
up.”  For UTC, the revenue from Otis Corporation accounted for the bulk of the $3.1 
billion in sales in China last year, and it is estimated that China’s economy will grow 9.9 
percent this year.100  With results and high expectations for both companies, and a large 
reliance on their civilian sector’s total revenue to maintain operations, it appears as 
though these two defense corporations have a large reliance on the civilian Chinese 
market and would, therefore, be highly vulnerable to Chinese sanctions. 
This is not to say that effective sanctions on the civilian sectors of Northrop 
Grumman, Raytheon and Lockheed Martin would not have a profound affect on these 
corporations.  Referring back to the findings of Jonathan Galloway, these corporations 
regardless of percentage, will take the necessary actions to rebalance the equilibrium 
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between the three markets: Governmental, Domestic Civilian, and Foreign.101  It is hard 
to fathom any corporation willingly taking hits on their overall revenue.  While Raytheon 
only receives 7% of their total revenue from their civilian sector, this still amounts to 
$1.6 billion, which is no small amount.   
While civilian revenue for these three corporations is significant, their overall 
civilian operations in China are minimal as compared to UTC and Boeing.  In this case, 
both UTC and Boeing depend on the Chinese market to make sales and purchases.  Their 
dependence on the Chinese economy goes beyond that of supply chains and logistics, but 
also depends on consumer buying and open markets.  This dependence separates them 
from the others in that they have become more vulnerable to the PRC. 
If China does impose the threatened sanctions against these DMNCs it could 
prove to be detrimental to their international operations.  While the military sectors of 
these defense corporations would not be affected by sanctions from China, considering 
that China does not buy U.S. weapons, the civilian sectors are left relatively unprotected.  
The combined dynamics of a large reliance on civilian revenue and pressure from a 
government that has a lucrative market for their civilian sectors to operate in, only 
demonstrates a larger possibility that certain defense corporations will be more likely to 
adhere to the foreign government’s will over that of their host national government’s 
desires. 
2. Exploitation by Use of Foreign Competitors 
Another way in which China can exploit a major weakness in certain civilian 
sectors of the defense corporations is through pre-existing competitive rivalries.  In most 
cases, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon, UTC, Northrop Grumman and other defense 
corporations are in tight contention for defense contracts relating in their respective 
fields, however, as was discussed, China does not have an ability to affect this.  There are 
pre-existing rivalries in the civilian sectors that can be exploited to create even more 
pressure on the defense corporations involved in the Taiwan arms sale.   
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The targeting of corporations with strong rivals can serve two purposes: it can 
cause civilian revenue of the defense corporations to decrease, and increase the 
competitive gain of their key competitor.  Not only do they lose that part of the market, 
but their competitor also ends up gaining from it, therefore delivering a double blow to 
the defense corporation under fire.  In tight competition for new markets like China, this 
sort of altercation can result in a major setback to the defense corporation’s civilian 
revenue and could become a crippling long-term effect.  Not only does the rival gain 
from a sanction in China, but also, due to the increased capital, the rival will have the 
ability to use this gain in other competitive areas to help increase funding in their global 
market. 
There are many different types of rivalries that exist in the market.  Raytheon, 
Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman mainly compete with each other for defense 
contracts and their civilian revenue is relatively low as compared to others.  This, 
therefore, indicates that they are somewhat protected from a Chinese exploitation of the 
key rivalries between them.    
Conglomerate corporations might have several different rivals by the existence of 
multiple sectors and markets under which they operate.  Therefore no one company is 
completely identical to that of another conglomerate corporation and the existence of a 
specific rivalry is rare.  UTC is a conglomerate that has different civilian sectors like Otis 
elevators and Carrier air-conditioners.102  The sanctions against UTC would result in 
fewer Otis elevators and Carrier products; however, there are many different elevator and 
air-conditioner companies operating in China and, therefore, no specific competitor 
would gain from such sanctions.  This therefore does not affect the global 
competitiveness of the civilian sector of UTC but only local competitiveness in the 
Chinese market.  Therefore, the sanctions will not make UTC as vulnerable. 
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Boeing on the other hand has one major rival, Airbus.  As most would claim, the 
rivalry between Boeing and Airbus is the largest international rivalry in the world.103  
Both companies are identical in that their civilian sectors develop comparable 
commercial aircrafts that are competitive on the global market.  Foreign corporations that 
choose to buy a commercial jet are usually considering whether or not they choose 
Airbus or Boeing and at times will use the two corporations to play off each other in a 
bidding war.  The stakes are extremely high for each corporation being that a single deal 
with an airline could be a deciding factor between success and failure over a multibillion-
dollar investment.104  Therefore, one of the best strategies for both Boeing and Airbus is 
that of persuading prospective buyers such as nationally owned airlines (as is the case in 
China), to purchase their planes over the others.105   
a. Boeing Versus Airbus in China 
The competition between Boeing and Airbus has been extremely tight 
over the years.  Neither company has been able to pull away from the other, so the 
slightest change in their global market share gives each company a comparable advantage 
over the other.  For such a close race, it can be seen how important the Chinese market is 
to both companies.  According to China’s own projections, they believe they will 
quadruple their aircraft fleet to 3,900 by 2025, which will create a large amount of 
potential revenue for either Boeing or Airbus.106  To further this, Boeing expects China to 
spend over $400 billion to purchase planes over the next couple of years, thus making  
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China the second largest aeronautics market in the world.107  China “probably has the 
most potential of any significant market in the world,” said the Airbus China President 
Laurence Barron.108  
However, with such a tight contention, is Boeing at a point that they can 
handle a head-to-head challenge with Airbus in China, especially if sanctions are 
involved?  With airlines in other markets struggling, and Boeing itself still trying to 
recover from its much-delayed Dreamliner 787 project, Boeing seems to be on shaky 
ground and stands to lose more than Airbus.109  Along with this, before the arms sales to 
Taiwan, Airbus was already winning more orders from China than Boeing.110  
While Boeing currently has 736 Boeing planes operating in China (and 
another 30 from McDonnell-Douglas, which Boeing-acquired in 1997), Airbus only has 
547.  However, over the past couple of years, Airbus’s orders from China have 
dramatically shifted to give Airbus the advantage.  As of February 2010, Chinese airlines 
have placed orders for 358 Airbus planes and have options for another 14, while they 
have only ordered 244 new planes from Boeing and have placed no options for further 
units.  Airbus has also acquired letters of intent towards future sales of 60 planes, 
compared to 40 for Boeing.111    
Because the three largest airline companies (China Southern, China 
Eastern, and Air China) are still controlled by the Chinese government, the purchasing of 
commercial airliners is highly politicized where government officials have the ability to 
reward foreign governments with airplane sales that meet the interests of China.112  In 
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response to such a system, Airbus, in June 2008, built an assembly base in Tianjin.113  By 
developing an assembly factory in Tianjin, Airbus is hoping that building aircraft in 
China (and the corresponding transfer of technology) will strengthen its position with the 
Chinese government to a better one than that of Boeing.  To further this, Airbus has also 
developed an engineering center in Beijing that will train up to 200 local engineers to 
assist in the plant operations in Tianjin.114  In China, “if you allow for more local 
production and information-sharing, the purchaser is going to be a lot more willing to 
accept your aircraft,” says Peter Harbison, executive chairman of the Center for Asia 
Pacific Aviation in Sydney.115   
Boeing on the other hand is at a disadvantage.  Hindered by unions and 
concerns of the company shifting jobs overseas, Boeing has had to maintain production in 
the United States.  However, Boeing has argued that their presence in China is significant 
because Boeing buys parts from seven local manufacturers in China.  Boeing spokesman, 
Yukui Wang, stated that Boeing is the Chinese aviation industry’s largest foreign 
customer.  He stresses that Boeing, over the years, has bought $1.5 billion in aircraft parts 
and services from China and that this figure “will double in the next few years…  
Chinese suppliers now have a role in all of Boeing airplanes.”116  To emphasize their 
commitment to China, Boeing ramped up its efforts and sent a sales director to Beijing to 
become the company’s first China-based sales executive—which is something that is not 
normally practiced by Boeing.117 
Even with the past level of competition between Boeing and Airbus, 
Boeing is now at a large disadvantage because of their defense sector’s sales of the 
Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.  If China enacts the sanctions against Boeing, Boeing will 
have to face a strong rival who just became stronger, while they lost major ground in the 
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battle over the Chinese market.  Even if China does not impose the sanctions, the Chinese 
government will probably be more likely to purchase planes from, and therefore support a 
company that does not sell weapons to areas of concern and complies with their national 
interests.  
The defense corporations that are more reliant on their defense sales and, 
therefore, are not as competitive in the civilian sectors, such as Raytheon, Northrop 
Grumman, and Lockheed Martin, are not under the same kind of pressure to expand their 
international production base and depend on foreign markets as is Boeing (due to their 
competitive nature with Airbus).  If China were to take sanctions against Boeing, they 
would be able to meet their aeronautical needs by buying planes from Airbus, who is 
Boeing’s tight competitor.  Therefore not only is Boeing losing the revenue, but their 
main competitor is gaining from the sanctions.  This double-edged sword would increase 
pressure on Boeing to try and mitigate the sanctions and adhere to the Chinese request, 
thereby restoring their share of the world market and their political favor in the eyes of 
the Chinese government. 
C. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
In this section, we have explored the possible vulnerabilities due to foreign 
subcontracting, and civilian operations internationally.  It was shown that foreign 
subcontracting is not only prevalent in defense operations but that there is no clear way of 
demarking and tracking exactly where all parts and pieces are made and assembled.  This 
is alarming in that it opens opportunities for foreign meddling and highlights a lack of 
understand on how truly the defense sector depends on foreign supplies and assistance.  It 
is only clear that levels of dependency do exist and that the controls in place are 
inadequate to exactly track such vulnerabilities.  
However, while foreign subcontracting does exist at alarming rates, it appears to 
be an inefficient means for the PRC to exploit.  To attack this, the PRC would have to 
hinder their own economic success by hindering their own domestic corporations’ 
production.  This might have a profound effect on U.S. DMNCs revenue and time scales;  
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however, the consequences to the PRC would appear to be too great.  It was shown that 
DMNCs are vulnerable to foreign subcontracting, but this does not appear to be a useful 
method of retaliation for the PRC to employ. 
The attack on civilian sectors, however, appears to be a very viable means to 
place pressure on the defense corporations.  To varying degrees, DMNCs depend on this 
revenue and cannot sit idly by while an economic behemoth like China takes action 
against them.  The level of pressure increases on corporations like Boeing who depend on 
China as a source of revenue and are in high contention with a competing company.  
With the stakes so high and the potential so great in China, Boeing stands to lose a great 
deal if China does place sanctions on their aircraft.  Also, being that the sales of aircraft 
are highly politicized, the decisions of the U.S. government to sell weapons to Taiwan, 
appears to not be in the best interest of Boeing.  Their connection to the United States 
through their defense sector will cause them political battles in the future and could cause 
major hardship for the corporation.    
Therefore, sanctions on civilian corporations appear to be a highly effective and 
efficient means in which the PRC can place great pressure and hardship on the U.S. 
defense corporations.  This, therefore, requires further research to ensure that the PRC 
has a legitimate means in which to place sanctions on the U.S. corporations.  In the next 
section, we will analyze whether or not the PRC can legally place sanction on U.S. 
DMNCs and whether the United States has any rules or regulations that can mitigate such 
transgressions.   
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IV. FORMS OF PROTECTIONISM TOWARD DMNCS 
A. CAN THE WTO HELP PROTECT DMNCS 
In response to the recent U.S. sales to Taiwan, the PRC has utilized the tool of 
sanctions as a form of coercion.  They have not only challenged the decision of the 
United States to sell weapons to Taiwan, but have also challenged the corporations 
involved in the decision of the U.S. government.  For the sanctions to have any teeth 
against these corporations, they must have a viable means of being legally employed 
against the U.S. corporations involved.  Their validity must be unhindered by global 
institutions and unchallengeable by the international community.  This, therefore, calls 
into questions whether or not the international norms and regulations could allow China 
to invoke such a serious action against U.S. corporations. 
The unifying organization in international economics is the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  Adopting the provisions of the General Agreements to Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), the WTO strives to facilitate and foster liberalized trade amongst its 
members.  This international organization not only establishes a framework for 
negotiations, but also provides a dispute resolution process to ensure participants adhere 
to the WTO rules and regulations.  Considering that China and the United States are both 
members of the WTO, it would be through this organization in which China would 
operate under in placing sanctions against another country. 
While sanctions by their very nature are counter-intuitive to the overarching goal 
of the WTO, they are still legal.  Article XXI of the GATT states:  
 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
  (a) to require any contracting party to furnish any  
  information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to  
  its essential security interests; or 
  (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action  
  which it considers necessary for the protection of its  
  essential security interests 
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   (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials  
   from which they are derived 
   (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and  
   implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
   and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly  
   for the purpose of supplying a military   
   establishment; 
   (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in  
   international relations; or 
  (c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action  
  in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations  
  Charter for the maintenance of international peace and  
  security.118 
As can be seen, Article XXI not only gives nations the clearance to immediately 
interrupt trade relations but also allows the sanctions to occur without being bogged 
down with the WTO dispute resolution process.119  Therefore, China has the ability to 
levee sanctions on U.S. corporations if it is deemed necessary under the auspice of 
“essential security interests.”   
As officially published on the embassy website of the PRC in the United States, 
Zhang Hanlin, director of the WTO Institute of the University of International Business 
and Economics stated, “As the sales to Taiwan poses a threat to China’s national security, 
China has the right to penalize the companies.”120  Considering that the sovereignty of 
Taiwan is not officially recognized by the WTO, it would appear as though China has a 
valid point in perceiving the sales to Taiwan as an illegal transport or trafficking of arms 
into their own territory and, therefore, can be considered a security concern for the PRC.  
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Therefore under the guidance of Article XXI, China has a legitimate reason to believe the 
arms sales are contrary to the “essential security interests” of the PRC.  While this 
reasoning stands, the United States cannot use the legal framework of the WTO to 
intervene or mitigate such sanctions by the PRC.   
Along with the provisions of Article XXI, Zhang also stated that China had never 
signed the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and, therefore, has the right to decide 
whether or not they purchase U.S. civilian aircraft from certain corporations.121  The 
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft is a WTO agreement entered into force in 1980 that 
attempts to mitigate import duties on all aircraft with the exception of those purchased for 
military use.122  This agreement also extends to aircraft parts, components and flight 
simulators.  Because China refused to sign this agreement, they are therefore free to place 
import duties on all foreign civilian aircraft and components thus allowing them to affect 
the cost and competitiveness of certain foreign corporations that are involved in the 
sector.  While Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon take part in certain components involved 
civilian aircraft, they are small compared to the level of investment that Boeing has in 
this sector.  This, therefore, appears to be a direct threat against a certain sector, and, 
therefore, a certain defense corporation.   
After analysis of the WTO provisions and, therefore, Article XXI, it appears as 
though China has a legitimate means on which to launch sanctions against the 
corporations of the United States.  Seeing that Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign 
state by most of the international community, it can be seen that the sales are, therefore, 
against the “essential security interests” of the PRC.  What is most striking though, is the 
official remark against civilian aircraft, which appears to have a specific target in mind.  
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B. ARE U.S. DEFENSE SECTORS VULNERABLE TO CHINA? 
By their very nature, defense corporations are intertwined with their host nations 
especially for those in the United States.  Unlike civilian corporations, because of the 
sensitivity of their products to U.S. security, they are under high supervision and are 
highly scrutinized by the government.  Over the years, the United States has installed 
many programs, regulations, laws and supervisory boards to help control export of U.S. 
defense articles to foreign countries and protect their overall national assets. 
1. Arms Export Controls 
One of the most significant defining measures to ensure such actions take place is 
the U.S. code Title 22 Chapter 39, which outlines the arms export controls.123  According 
to Subchapter III, § 2778 of Chapter 39, the U.S. president has direct control on all 
exports and imports of defense articles and can provide foreign policy guidance to those 
designated to receive U.S. weapons or defense services.  The president is also authorized 
to determine that which is designated as defense article and defense services therefore 
controlling the export of that which is deemed as U.S. weapons.124  It is under this 
chapter that U.S. defense corporations must receive the approval and guidance from the 
U.S. government before they can work with and or sell weapons to other countries. 
China, albeit a robust militarized nation, does not receive weapons from the 
United States. Following the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, the U.S. president 
under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act placed embargoes on military 
articles and services to the PRC.  A mere 20 days later the European Union enacted the 
same embargoes on the PRC and neither has lifted them since.125  Therefore China has 
no part in the market of the defense sectors of the U.S. defense corporations. 
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Considering that the PRC is not an authorized nation to currently receive any 
weapons from the United States, it appears as though the Chinese do not have a direct 
ability to place sanctions on U.S. defense articles.  They, therefore, have no means to 
attack these defense articles considering they are not a part of the U.S. weapons market 
and can therefore not affect their pricing or their marketability.  From this information it 
can be seen that the threatened sanctions by the PRC appear to not be aimed at the 
defense sectors of these corporations.  If this is truly the case, then what part of these 
corporations does China have the power to affect by sanctions?   
2. Buy American 
Because of the rapid increase of foreign sourcing by DMNCs in the 1980s, 
domestic corporations were left to the wayside seeing their revenue decrease.  These 
uncompetitive corporations called upon Congress to act to protect the U.S. corporations 
and maintain U.S. investment within national borders.  Answering to their pleas, 
Congress added 18 restrictions deemed the “Buy American” acts.126  Their overall 
objectives were to require prime contractors to subcontract within the United States to 
ensure that outsourcing was mitigated and to help maintain revenue within the economy.  
As can be seen, the objectives of the Buy American restrictions sounded good on 
paper, but caused real hardship on both the DoD and prime contractor DMNCs.  In 1986, 
the DoD published two reports that highlighted the effects of these restrictions.  They 
argued that Buy American restrictions caused significant unfavorable effects on both the 
cost and quality of weapons systems and caused major delays in weapons 
procurement.127  In 1989, the DoD conducted an extensive analysis of the Buy American 
restrictions recommending “that most congressionally mandated Buy American 
restrictions be abolished” and that “Congress should avoid future use of Buy American 
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restrictions in procurement.”128  In response to the concerns of the DoD, Congress 
authorized the Secretary of Defense the authority to issue waivers in situations he deemed 
necessary.  This allowed the Secretary of Defense to grant DMNCs the ability to 
subcontract operation internationally whenever deemed necessary. 
With this waiver capability, DMNCs quickly maneuvered to use the newfound 
loophole and continue international subcontracting.  A GAO report in 1991 found that the 
Buy American restrictions were of “limited impact because of the many exceptions 
allowed.”129  The extensive use of these loopholes were so great that in 1988 a 
corporation proposed a lawsuit against the DoD claiming that the waivers granted were 
not within the Buy American Act.130 
With the DoD vehement arguments and lobbying from DMNCs, the Buy 
American restriction lost power and effectiveness.  Their existence, although inefficient 
on the industry, would have been a starting point for mitigating certain levels of foreign 
dependencies 
C. CONCLUSION 
As can be seen, there is a significant amount of protection towards “sensitive 
information.”  The advancements and capabilities of the defense sectors are worth 
protecting and have adequate oversight and regulations.  However, does this protect all 
facets of DMNCs operations? 
China has a viable argument in that the arms sales can logically be seen as a threat 
to their national security.  The provisions in the WTO therefore allows China to sanction 
corresponding corporations of the country in challenge, in this case the United States. 
China not only has an ability to reject U.S. goods, but can also target specific 
corporations.  This leaves the DMNCs at the discretion of the PRC.  
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While the defense sectors of the corporations appear to be adequately protected, 
the civilian sectors are not.  They are susceptible to Chinese sanctions and are open to 
attack.  While the “Buy American” policies appear to have great intention in maintaining 
a subcontracting base domestically, as has been shown, DMNCs have continually found 
ways around this to make these regulations and laws useless to a certain degree. 
Therefore, it is the conclusion of this section that there are no adequate 
regulations or laws in place to protect the civilian sectors of the DMNCs and DMNCs are 
free to subcontract internationally with little oversight.  While the foreign subcontracting 
appears to be an inefficient opportunity for China to attack, the civilian sectors appear to 
be a prime target.  Not only can China affectively employ sanctions hindering U.S. 
DMNCs, they also have no laws, regulations or red tape that would hinder their move 
against the civilian sectors of these DMNCs.  Neither the WTO nor the U.S. government 
would be able to mitigate Chinese sanctions. 
 56
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57
V. CONCLUSION 
To date, the PRC has yet to make any significant steps toward the threatened 
sanctions.  In almost a year, nothing has actually occurred; however, this does not mean 
that such steps will not be taken at some point in the future.  The January 2010 
announcement over the sales of weapons to Taiwan was exactly that, an announcement.  
Technically, there is still time for the DMNCs to change their role in the process and 
adhere to the coercive threats of the PRC.  This thesis does not try to answer whether or 
not the PRC will enact sanctions as proposed.  Instead it only tries to establish a 
framework in which the Chinese government could effectively and efficiently enact 
strong pressure on these corporations. 
This thesis began with an analysis of past behaviors and observations and found 
that it was not beyond comprehension that DMNCs would buckle to foreign pressure 
over the interests of their host nation.  Instead, DMNCs would take necessary actions to 
ensure they rebalanced their three markets and repaired any damages that occurred.  
Understanding that DMNCs are capable of such actions, this thesis then provided an in-
depth analysis of two possible areas of DMNC vulnerabilities: foreign subcontracting and 
the respective civilian sectors of the DMNCs.  It concluded that DMNCs depend 
significantly on foreign subcontracting and that it is near impossible for DMNCs to know 
exactly who makes every component in their weapon systems.  The existence of 
ambiguity in the level of foreign involvement in U.S. weapons development is unnerving 
and highly problematic.  However, further analysis showcased that the exploitation of 
foreign subcontractors in China could be detrimental to the overall health of the Chinese 
economy and would therefore offer an inefficient means to pressure American DMNCs. 
The next area of focus was on civilian components of the DMNCs.  All five 
DMNCs have varying dependencies on their civilian sector revenue, and so sanctions 
aimed at these sectors could have profound effects.  It was also noted that Boeing, due to 
the existence of an international competitor, was at most risk of such sanctions because it 
could ill afford a setback in such a lucrative market as China’s.  Due to the highly 
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politicized nature of aircraft contracts, it would be relatively easy for China to shift favor 
to Airbus, thus delivering a double blow to the already troubled Boeing Corporation.   
The only saving grace to such a situation is if legal platforms or institutions had 
legitimate means of stopping such pressures.  However, caveats in the WTO guidelines 
permit the PRC to impose sanctions on these DMNCs, and there appears to be no U.S. 
law or regulation that could mitigate such an attack on the civilian sectors of these 
corporations.  To further this, it appears that Beijing is aware of such open capability and 
was resolute in reminding Washington of their rights in the WTO and that they had not 
signed the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.  In pointing out this fact Beijing appears 
to be specifically targeting Boeing.  This makes sense insofar as this research has 
concluded that sanctions on civilian sectors would have a more profound affect on 
Boeing than any other DMNC.  Beijing currently stands in a position from which it could 
either: 
a. Covertly ensure Chinese airlines buy more Airbus than Boeing.131  
This gives Beijing the added benefit of not alarming foreign 
countries, while still making its case clear to the corporation the 
result of not yielding to the interests of the PRC.  If this were the 
case, one should not expect a large statement being made by either 
corporation or government, and could already be in progress. 
b. Overtly placing sanctions on these DMNCs thus hindering their 
civilian sectors and costing the corporations millions if not billions 
in the process.  This would have political and economical 
ramifications, but would also serve as a direct hit on the U.S. 
government and be an open message that continued sales of 
weapons to Taiwan will trigger drastic steps in response.  This 
would also be a clear message that the threats by the PRC are real 
and that the Chinese Government did exactly what it threatened to 
do. 
                                                 
131 Remember that these are state owned and run corporations. 
 59
c. Do nothing.  In this case, the threats were empty.  This thesis 
shows that Beijing has the means to effectively and efficiently 
place sanctions on these corporations; however, if the PRC chooses 
to do nothing, then there exist factors that were not considered in 
this thesis.  If this is the case, then this research should be 
expanded in time to understand why the PRC chose to do nothing. 
The PRC has made clear its disagreement to the weapons sales however has not 
made clear exactly how they would go about holding U.S. DMNCs responsible.  This 
thesis concludes that the PRC has the power to cause great pressure on U.S. corporations 
that do not comply to its interests.  However, whether or not it does deploy this power 
remains to be seen. 
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